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2Introduction
During the US takeover wave in the eighties management in several firms began
to introduce various takeover defenses making it more difficult to conduct a
“hostile” takeover and replace the incumbent management. Contrary to Europe,
only Britain has witnessed a similar degree of takeover activity as in the US.
This fact reflects a fundamental difference between the Anglo-American and the
European corporate governance system although there is a tendency towards
convergence. The European Union has attempted to harmonize the legislation
towards the Anglo-American principle of “one share–one vote” in order to promote
a free market of services and goods, including companies (c.f. the draft of the 5th
Directive). Thus, the EU high level group of company law experts recently
released a report on issues related to takeover bids (see Winter et al. 2002)
seeking to identify various constraints for a well functioning market for corporate
control within the EU. It is proposed that when a bidder gains at least 75 percent
of a firms capital, he should be able to exercise a proportional percentage of the
total votes that can be cast in a general meeting of shareholders.
However, there is little consensus among the European countries regarding this
question and the Continental European countries have for example not yet
adopted the principle of one share-one vote. As a consequence, management in
many European companies is insulated from hostile takeovers since it is
protected through various constructions that constitute a breach on the
mentioned principle. This includes the use of shares with dual class voting rights,
ownership and voting limitations together with foundation ownership which are
all present on the Danish stock market. As a result, there is a lower degree of
contested takeovers in Denmark compared to the US and Britain. Approximately,
a dozen firms have been exposed to “hostile” takeovers” during the last ten years.
This article focuses on how managerial incentives are influenced by the presence
of effective takeover defenses, a question that also relates to the debate over
whether the  EU should promote a market for corporate control in Continental
Europe. This is done by testing a number of financial hypotheses of listed Danish
firms in which management is effectively protected against takeovers.
3The article shows that takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist
of shares with dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation
ownership. The article finds that unprotected firms have significantly more debt
to equity (financial leverage) compared to protected firms. One suggestion is that
debt may serve as a substitution for takeover defenses. However, protected firms
are not more oriented towards long term investments and do not have more
excess liquidity compared to unprotected firms. This indicates, that agency costs
in relation to Danish managers access to “free cash flow” are low.
The theory about the market for corporate control is primarily based on large and
efficient capital markets, such as the US capital market. One therefore might
question whether these theories are directly applicable to smaller capital markets
such as the Danish capital market. In particular, whether the preconditions for a
market for corporate control are fully satisfied in Denmark as well as in other
smaller economies. Not only does the legal protection of shareholders differ
compared to the US, but there may be other factors constraining the market for a
corporate control in Denmark, which imply that unprotected firms are not
instantaneously facing a direct threat of a hostile takeover.
The article is organized as follows. The literature is reviewed in the next section
followed in section 3 by a description of the hypotheses. Section 4 describes
Danish companies use of takeover defenses. Section 5 presents the data and
methodology. This is followed by section 6 which presents the results of the single
equation models, including robustness. Simultaneous equation estimation is
carried out in section 7 dealing explicitly with the problem of causation between
the variables. The article ends with a conclusion in section 8.
2. Literature
Proponents of a market for corporate control argue that it serves as a mechanism
to solve the principal-agent problem working as an arena in which managers
compete for resources to manage (see Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Scharfstein
(1988)).
4Jensen (1986) suggests that takeovers help some firms to redistribute their
excess cash flow to their shareholders instead of keeping it in the firm. According
to Jensen, management prefers to have excess cash that may serve as a buffer
when projects turn out to have negative net present value (NPV) or to engage in
opportunistic behavior (empire building).
Jensen argues that debt may contribute to discipline managers (see also Schleifer
and Vishny 1996 for a review). Jensen defines the free cash flow as cash flow in
excess of all the projects with positive NPV. Less enthusiastic about the market
for corporate control are Franks and Mayer (1990) who recognize that  there is a
tradeoff. Takeovers may result in a higher level of managerial correction but only
at the expense of long-term investment.
Whether takeover defenses are preferable or not is still a controversial question.
According to the so-called shareholder interest hypothesis takeovers benefit
shareholders since target management achieves a better bargaining position to
influence the takeover process and thereby extract a higher offer from the bidder
on behalf of all target shareholders. Without takeover defenses e.g. stipulated as a
fair price provision in the corporate charter there exist incentives for individual
shareholders to tender at a lower price than a collusive group could extract from
a bidder in an attempt to appropriate the premium associated with a tender offer
(see DeAngelo and Rice (1983)).
Schleifer and Vishny (1986) develop a model in which greenmail may benefit
shareholders. They argue that the adoption of takeover defenses may encourage
some of the bidders to pursue a combination with the target firm since the use of
greenmail reduces the number of bidders. Thus, the presence of takeover
defenses signals that the target firm does not have access to a white knight.
Stein (1988) formulates a model based on the informational asymmetry between
shareholders (including raiders) and management where he shows that takeover
defenses benefit shareholders. He argues that signaling behavior by the
management becomes important when there is a chance that raiders will exploit
temporary mispricings of the stock and therefore buy the firm at a lower price
than management regards as fair.
5To avoid such a situation management may influence stock prices by inflating
earnings, acting in the interest of the (existing) shareholders thereby preventing
them from being cheated by raiders. Thus, the shareholder interest hypothesis
regards takeover defenses as a long-term employment contracts for incumbent
management creating incentives towards taking long-term financial decisions.
In opposition stands the shareholder entrenchment hypothesis which argues that
takeover defenses are initiated at the expense of the shareholders when
incumbent management wants to engages in opportunistic behavior combined
with job protection. Takeover defenses therefore insulate management from being
part of the managerial labor market wherein alternative teams compete for the
rights to manage corporate resources (see Jensen and Ruback (1983)).
Turning to the empirical evidence, various studies examine the reaction of the
introduction of different takeover defenses on the share price although with
mixed results, whereas the literature is scarce concerning the relationship
between takeover defenses and managerial incentives. Bojanic and Officer (1994)
conduct a traditional event study to assess the impact on firm value of
antitakeover amendments (with mixed results). In addition, they look at
accounting profitability measures and find that management of efficiently-run
firms may construct takeover barriers to deter value-diminishing takeovers.
Rao and Johnson (1997) use a longitudinal approach to examine the impact of
antitakeover amendments on several financial attributes of the firms, including
measures of financial leverage, accounting profitability, R & D/sales and capital
expenditures/sales. They conclude that antitakeover amendments are not value
destroying in terms of their impact on various fundamental firm performance
measures. In another study Jonhson and Rao (1999) find that antitakeover
charter amendments do not impact either takeover activity or takeover premiums
following their adoption.
Mahoney, Sundaramurthy and Mahoney (1997) find that firms adopting
antitakeover provisions significantly decrease subsequent long-term investment
on an industry-adjusted basis. They analyze changes over the period 1984-88 in
three measures of long-term investments after a firm adopts antitakeover
provisions: capital expenditures/sales, R & D/sales and the sum of capital
6expenditures/sales and R & D/sales. They control for several corporate
governance variables, including institutional and insider holdings as well as the
proportion of outsiders on corporate boards and separate CEO/chairperson
positions. However, they have an insignificant effect on subsequent long-term
investment behavior.
Safieddine and Titman (1999) find that firms protected by antitakeover laws
substantially reduce their debt and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This
suggests that managers in unprotected firms are motivated to take on debt they
would otherwise avoid. They argue that higher leverage decreases the probability
of a firm being taken over since it commits management in target firms to make
improvements and restructuring that a potential raider would do. In this light
debt serves as a substitute for takeover defenses and we would expect a lower
degree of leverage in protected firms. In addition, Borokhovich, Brunarski and
Parrino (1997) look at the relation between antitakeover charter amendments and
compensation contracts. They find that antitakeover measures help managers
protect above-market levels of compensation.
3. Hypotheses
The articles first two hypotheses relate to whether management in firms,
protected against takeovers are more oriented towards long-term financial
investments. However, finding financial ratios that give unbiased estimates of this
question is not a straightforward task. As mentioned, the majority of studies look
at how takeover defenses influence changes in R & D expenditures since low R &
D costs are associated with short-term incentives. Contrary to both international
accounting standards (IAS 9) as well as US and British accounting regulation
(SSAP 13 and FAS 2) the Danish Accounting Act does not require firms to report
yearly R & D expenditures. Instead, Danish firms may voluntarily report the
amount and are free to decide whether the expenditures are going to be written
off directly on the income statement or placed under intangible assets and
amortized.
7Nearly all the firms in the sample have written off the R & D expenses directly on
the income statement but only a very few firms actually report the amount in the
financial accounts (14%). All prior empirical studies make use of the ratio of R &
D to sales as an indication for a firms short or long-term orientation.
Even though SSAP 13,  FAS 2 and IAS 9 give some examples of what
arrangements are to be classified as R & D expenses, the ratio may be inadequate
in a cross-sectional analysis, since management has a high degree of discretion
concerning, what and how much to disclose as R & D expenses. As a
consequence this article considers the following alternative hypotheses.
H1:  Management in firms that are effectively protected against takeovers have
higher tangible assets to total assets compared to management in unprotected
firms.
The first hypothesis measures the extent of a firm being engaged in long-term
investment projects. According to the Danish Accounting Act tangible assets are
assets which are determined for permanent use or ownership by the company,
and those which do not fall into the mentioned category are defined as current
assets. A high ratio indicates that the firm has devoted a relatively large amount
of resources into assets for permanent use instead of investing in current assets
that are assumed to be more realizable. However, since securities may be
recorded as tangible as well as current assets it has been necessary to remove all
securities from the balance sheet. This is because management’s decision of
whether a security is a tangible or a current asset is up to the incumbent
management’s discretion which may be manipulated through the choice of
accounting valuation principle.
The ratio of tangible assets to total assets may also be given another
interpretation, namely as a proxy for operational risk. Normally, one defines
operational leverage as the ratio of fixed costs to total costs. Firms that have a
relatively large fraction of fixed costs would gain considerably by an increase in
sales but would at the same time experience a considerable loss when the sales
decrease.
8Operational leverage is one measure of a firm’s total risk. But it is difficult to
asses precisely because not all Danish firms report the distribution of costs
between fixed and total costs due to chosen accounting principles. Instead, the
overall costs are allocated between production, sales and administrative
expenses. For this reason financial analysts estimate a firms operational leverage
using a correlated proxy. 47 firms in the sample report variable costs in the
income statement. The correlation between fixed costs to total costs and tangible
assets to total assets is equal to 61. This suggests that tangible assets to total
assets serves as a good proxy for a firm’s operational leverage.
H2:  Management in firms that are effectively protected against takeovers have
higher investing activities to total assets compared to management in
unprotected firms.
The financial ratio investing activities to assets tries to capture how much
management is engaged in long-term investment activities in which management
gives up a certain amount of cash today for an uncertain cash flow stream in the
future. In order to get a more reliable picture of a given firms investment
activities, the nominator in the ratio is obtained from the firms cash flow
statement. It represents investment in tangible assets (machines, land and real-
estate etc.) as well as cash paid for the acquisition of other firms.
Besides affecting the previously mentioned financial ratios, takeover defenses
may also influence the choice of capital structure or financial leverage i.e. the
amount of debt relative to equity.
H3:  Management in firms that are effectively protected against takeovers have
lower debt to equity ratios (leverage) compared to management in unprotected
firms.
Jensen (1986) argues that higher leverage may reduce managers’ tendency to
overinvest compared to what is optimal for shareholders. By issuing debt
management commits itself to repay the loans, thereby signaling that
9management will reduce the free cash flow. Contrary to debt, this is not the case
regarding equity since management is not obliged to pay dividends. One could
argue that managers in firms which are not effectively protected against takeovers
increase leverage in order to deter potential raiders.
Naturally, the choice of capital structure is not only influenced by management’s
concern about potential takeovers, but also by more traditional considerations
regarding the choice of capital structure.  The literature dealing with a firm’s
choice of capital structure is enormous and the financial theory has proposed
several factors that may influence the mix between debt and equity, although
empirical studies about the role of takeover defenses are relatively scarce.
The last two hypotheses concern the presence of “excess liquidity” in firms
wherein  management is protected against takeovers. These hypotheses are based
on Jensens Free Cash flow hypothesis, where the free cash flow is defined as cash
left to management’s disposal after all projects with positive NPV have been
initiated. Jensens free cash flow hypothesis argues that a market for corporate
control reduces the amount of free cash flow available to management, thereby
reducing agency costs. From an economic perspective, all free cash flow should
be distributed to the shareholders, who can reinvest the proceeds in firms with
profitable investments projects. Free cash flow may be consumed by management
as non-pecuniary benefits. Jensen and Meckling (1976) formulate a rational
expectation model, where they show that the entrepreneurs consumption of non-
pecuniary benefits are borne by himself, since outside investors foresee this
consumption. This leads to under investment and therefore a welfare loss for
society.
H4:  Management in firms that are effectively protected against takeovers have
higher cash flow from operations minus investments and dividends to total
assets compared to management in unprotected firms.
The ratio cash flow from operations minus investments and dividends to assets
serves as a proxy for “excess liquidity”. A high negative ratio indicates that the
firm has invested (capital outflow) relatively more than firms with a low negative
10
ratio e.g. in tangible assets or acquisitions. If on the other hand, the ratio is
positive it indicates that management has saved funds and therefore builds
financial slack in the form of excess liquidity.
Any excess of cash that is necessary to run the firm’s operations (i.e. safety
liquidity to pay the future contingent claims) should therefore be paid to the
shareholders since the excess liquidity is not invested actively in projects with
positive NPV. However, Danish firms have traditionally kept a very low although
stable dividend ratio (see Møller and Parum (2001) for a critical discussion of
Danish firms dividend policy).
H5:  Management in firms that are effectively protected against takeovers have
higher investments in securities to total assets compared to management in
unprotected firms.
Another indication of the presence of excess cash is when management invests in
securities besides what is necessary to control the firms short term cash
management activities. This is because it is doubtful whether management may
obtain a higher return on its investment in securities compared to what
shareholders could receive on their own account. By investing in securities that
are negatively correlated with the firm they control, management may obtain a
portfolio gain and thereby reduce the risk and increase job security. Tax
considerations could also influence whether or not a firm should invest in
securities on behalf of shareholders but the Danish tax legislation does not give
management such incentives since shareholders’ tax burden in the two situations
is quite similar.
4.  Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms
The organization of the management in Danish firms differs from the Anglo-
American system, in particular by having two-tier boards like Germany. The
supervisory board represents the shareholders and monitors the board of
managing directors and has the power to decide in cases of extraordinary matters
or of major importance (c.f. § 54 in the Company Act).
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The supervisory board must not be dominated by the managing directors (c.f. §
51). The members of the supervisory board typically meet once a month and the
daily management of the firm is carried out through the board of managing
directors.
Table I. Descriptive statistics of takeover defenses for the sample set of 102
Danish firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange during 1995-99.
   CATEGORY                                                                           Percentage
  a)  Ownership limitations                                                              2,9
   b)  Voting rights limitations                                                          4,9
   c)  Clause of interests                                                                   5,9
   d)  Temporary suspension of voting rights                                   9,8
   e)  Shares with dual class voting rights                                     51,0
   f)  Right of preemption concerning A-shares                                9,8
   g)  Approval of transfer concerning A-shares                             12,7
   h)  Trust dominants ( > 50 % of the votes)                                  21,6
   i)  Statutory voting majority, different from 2/3                           2,9
Table I shows that Danish firms have adopted takeover defenses that are
considerably different from both U.S. and British firms, although they are similar
to takeover defenses adopted by other firms located in the EU (see Stonehill and
Dullum (1990)). It should be mentioned that the presence of dual class voting
rights does not necessarily constitute a takeover defense by itself (c.f. the
definition of an effective takeover defense in the end of this section).
Table I contains a description of the most common and applicable takeover
defenses accessible to the management in the target firm (see Schans
Christensen (1991) for a comparative description of specific defensive devices and
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strategies in Danish law and also Rose (2001) for a more detailed legal analysis of
potential takeover defenses by Danish firms). Danish takeover defenses are
characterized by being permanent. Contrary to the U.S. system they do not
become active when a takeover is immediately forthcoming.
Danish takeover defenses are stipulated in the corporate charter or articles of
incorporation as shark repellents apart from golden parachutes.
Golden parachutes only play a minor role as an instrument to prevent a takeover
by Danish firms, although it is difficult to assess for certain, since golden
parachutes are not reported to the public. Golden parachutes for the benefit of
the management could constitute a violation of the Company Act on fair
treatment and duty of loyalty, if the payment exceed what would be necessary to
give the board a fair compensation in the event of removal. It is also dubious how
effective golden parachutes are as takeover defenses. One could argue that golden
parachutes may actually promote takeovers since they reduce the existing
management’s resistance towards a takeover in which management is rewarded
with golden parachutes.
The first two categories of takeover defenses (a and b) consist of limitations of
ownership and voting rights which are almost completely absent in the U.S. Even
though they are not so widespread in the sample (nearly 8 percent) they are very
effective devices in order to insulate the existing management from hostile
takeovers. Since the Danish Company Act requires that these arrangements have
to be approved at the general meeting by statutory voting majority of 9/10 (c.f. §
79) such agreements would be practically impossible to implement nowadays.
They are a legacy from the past very often inspired from the co-operative
movement where such provisions were common and ideas concerning corporate
governance were almost non-existing.
The term clause of interest (c) stipulated in the corporate charter means that
shareholders who have agreed to coordinate their votes on a specific matter are
regarded as only one shareholder with reference to the number of votes. Such a
provision is often stipulated in order to avoid a loophole in ownership and voting
limitations.
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Almost 6 percent have adopted such a clause and it serves the same purpose as
voting and ownership limitations representing a serious restraint in achieving a
functioning market for corporate control.
Temporary suspension of voting rights (d) after the acquirer has bought the shares
is another device to make a takeover difficult. Nearly 10 percent of Danish firms
have adopted such provisions where the suspension typically last one or three
months. Since the acquirer has to report his holdings of shares to the company
every time he obtains a change of 5 percent of the shares, this gives management
the necessary time to implement strategies to protect itself against the takeover.
The management could for instance call for an extraordinary general meeting and
present proposals that could prevent the acquirer from gaining full control of the
firm.
Dual class voting rights (e) are adopted by more than half of the companies and
represents a large deviation from of takeover defenses used by U.S. firms.
although dual class voting rights are not totally absent in the U.S. (see the SEC
Rule 19c-4). Very often a foundation or trust holds the majority of the A-shares
with superior voting rights and blocks for a takeover, while the B-shares are
freely traded. The Danish Company Act provides that no shares may bear more
than 10 times the voting value of any other share of the same category (c.f. § 67).
Whether dual class voting rights should be allowed is still a controversial
question (see e.g. Lando (1991) and Niels Chr. Nielsen and Ebbesen (1994)).
The question cannot be viewed independently but must be seen in conjunction
with the ownership structure, in particular the extension of trust or foundation
ownership, which vary considerably within the EU (besides Denmark, foundation
ownership is common in the Netherlands).
In connection with dual class voting rights the corporate charter often states that
when one of the existing A-shareholders intends to sell his holdings of A-shares,
the other A-shareholders have a right of preemption (f) i.e. to buy the shares at a
fair price. This is the case for almost 10 percent of the companies. Another
possibility is to stipulate in the corporate charter that a transfer needs approval
(g) of the existing board of supervisors when an A-shareholder wants to sell which
is stipulated in almost 13 percent of the firms.
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While amendments of a corporation’s charter in the U.S. (Delaware) can be
conducted by the board of directors on its own, such an action requires the
approval of the shareholders on a general meeting which requires 2/3 statutory
voting majority (c.f. § 78) according to the Danish Company Act. Only very few
companies use the possibility to deviate by increasing the majority fraction from
the Companies Acts claim of statutory voting majority (i) of 2/3 (3 percent).
One reason might be that such a provision also could prevent the management
from changing the corporate charter into other events than a hostile takeover, e.g.
when it needs to change its purpose or place of incorporation.
Almost 65 percent of the firms have adopted White knights i.e. a right to issue
shares at market price without the shareholders right of preemption. The reason
for not showing the proportion of white knights in Table I is that it is questionable
whether an action to issue shares at market price without the stockholder’s right
of preemption would be in accordance with the Danish Company Act (see Schans
Christensen (1991) p.367). Normally, such a decision would require a statutory
voting majority of 2/3 at the general meeting. The law permits that the
shareholders can leave the decision and the terms to the management (c.f. § 37).
In principle, such an action is possible but as mentioned it could be in conflict
with the Danish Company Act (c.f. § 63 and § 80). This is because this action
would violate a principle of equality among the shareholders set forth in the Act
and thus conflict with the general standard (duty of loyalty) also codified in the
Company Act.
The general standard states that management may not pass any resolution which
is obviously likely to result in an undue advantage to certain shareholders or
third parties at the expense of other shareholders or the company.
Normally, a right to issue shares without the shareholder’s right of preemption is
not supposed to serve as a takeover defense due to the mentioned considerations.
Instead, very often in connection with a “friendly” acquisition, companies use the
right to issue shares without the existing shareholder’s right of preemption as a
measure of payment instead of cash. Such a provision enables  management to
obtain capital in a flexible manner.
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Poison pills are adopted by 5 percent of the firms, but it is also questionable
whether the use of a delegation to issue shares lower than market price without
all the shareholders’ right of preemption is possible under Danish law due to the
same problems as mentioned above (see Gomard (1989) p.129 as well as Schans
Christensen (1991)).
Thus, it is doubtful whether Poison pills or Green mail can be applied under
Danish law in a takeover situation since a company can only acquire 10 percent
of its own shares. Only under very extreme circumstances i.e. in a limited period
if necessary to avoid considerable and threatening damages (c.f. § 48a) it is
allowed. Since the shareholders can sell the shares at a high premium this would
require a decision at the general meeting that exclusively has the right to approve
the dividend (c.f. § 69).
To test the formulated hypotheses empirically, we need to define what we mean
by effective takeover defenses. This article defines a company to have an efficient
takeover defense, denoted by the dummy variable PROTEC, if it satisfies the
following characteristics; either the firm has
A) ownership limitations,  voting rights limitations or adopted a  clause of
interest
B) the company is dominated via dual class voting rights by a foundation  (trust)
that holds the voting majority (over 50 percent).
C) the company is also said to be efficiently protected if the A-shares with
superior voting rights represent more that 50 percent in a company given that
the corporate charter requires the board’s approval of transfer or the other A-
shareholders have a preemptive right of the A-shares. 30 firms satisfy the
above conditions (29 percent).
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Table II. Correlation matrix of Danish firms’ takeover defenses (binary variables)
The correlation matrix shows that there is a relatively high positive correlation
between dual class voting rights and trust ownership (correlation of 0,31), which
illustrates that trust ownership is mainly based on the use of dual class voting
rights. Table II further shows that there is a high positive correlation between
dual class voting rights and preemption rights as well as approval of transfer.
On the other hand, there is a negative correlation between the latter two
(correlation of -0,12), indicating that they substitute each other as legal
provisions to avoid contested takeovers in association with dual class voting
rights.
Table II also shows that the use of ownership/voting rights limitations is
negatively correlated with dual class voting rights, trust ownership and
preemption rights, indicating that firms which have adopted ownership/voting
rights limitations will tend not to use other types of takeover defenses, since they
already are effectively protected against takeovers. As expected, there is a high
positive correlation between PROTEC and the other takeover defenses. It is
interesting to note that a firm is not necessarily characterized as being protected,
solely if it has dual class voting rights (correlation of 0.29). We notice that the EU
proposal of one share-one vote will have serious effects on the Danish ownership
structure, since the correlation between both trust ownership and dual class
voting rights as well as PROTEC and trust ownership is relatively high.
Owner/voting limit. Appr. of transfer Preempt. right Trust ownersh. Dual class PROTEC
Owner/voting limit. 1,00
Appr. of transfer 0,04 1,00
Preemption right -0,08 -0,12 1,00
Trust ownership -0,16 -0,03 0,08 1,00
Dual class -0,25 0,30 0,26 0,31 1,00
PROTEC 0,39 0,43 0,37 0,21 0,29 1,00
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5. Data and methodology
Data consists of all firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange using
observations based on five years average (1995-1999). Banks, insurance
companies and mutual funds are excluded since they possess industry specific
features and are regulated by specific laws. Moreover, Danish banks, with a very
few exemptions, are all very small in terms of market capitalization. They operate
locally within a limited geographical area. Often the customers hold the majority
of the shares in their local bank, making any “hostile” takeover almost completely
impossible.
The few number of shipping companies are left out although it implies that the
largest Danish company (Maersk or the A. P. Møller group which is dominated by
two foundations) is excluded. The reason is that it is very difficult to get reliable
information of the company’s financial status due to the non transparent nature
of the annual accounts and ownership structure.
A few computer and IT companies are also excluded because they differ from the
rest of the sample especially because their annual accounts do not constitute a
reliable basis for any of the formulated hypotheses. Approximately half a dozen
firms have changed their corporate charter during the period with respect to
takeover defenses and are therefore excluded. This leaves us with a sample
consisting of 102 companies. See appendix for descriptive statistics and
correlation among the variables.
The information sources consist of the companies annual accounts together with
the articles of incorporation. To uncover the presence of foundation ownership it
has been necessary to use various works of reference since the Danish
accounting act does not oblige the company to report the exact holdings of any
foundations or other blockholders’ number of shares (ownership over 5 percent)..
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6.0 Single equation estimates
This section contains the empirical results of the financial hypotheses serving as
dependent variables.
Concerning the first hypothesis, table III shows the results of the estimations
when the dependent variable is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. It is
interesting to note that the results show that PROTEC is significantly different
from zero in all the equations.
Table III: Regression estimates of Tangible assets to Total Assets as the
dependent variable with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (see White
(1980)). 102 observations based on five year averages (1995-99). The numbers in
the parentheses are t-statistics.
PROTEC: Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is effectively protected
against takeovers according to the article’s definition of an effective takeover
defense, otherwise it equals zero.
LSDEBT:  The ratio of long-term debt to short-term debt.
DEBTEQ:  The ratio of both long-term and short-term debt to book equity.
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                            3.
CONSTANT                              0.265                        0.258                      0.309
                                          (7.306)                    (12.892)                   (14.847)
PROTEC                                   0.103                        0.103                      0.096
                                          (3.063)                      (3.156)                    (2.603)
LSDEBT                                   0.087                        0.088
                                               (3.854)                       (3.869)
DEBTEQ                                  -0.000
                                               (-0.006)
Adj. R2                                                        0.23                           0.23                      0.10
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The regression results seem to provide evidence that firms in which management
is effectively protected against takeovers have higher tangible assets compared to
firms in which management is not protected against takeovers. This indicates
that management in protected firms is relatively more oriented toward long term
financial decisions by allocating a higher proportion of resources for a permanent
basis. Based on the model, we can therefore not reject the first hypothesis. The
first control variable LSDEBT is positive and also significantly different from zero
suggesting that firms to a large extent finance their tangible assets by long-term
debt instead of borrowing short-term debt. The second control variable DEBTEQ
is not significant in either of the equations.
Furthermore, table III indicates that management in protected firms takes a
higher degree of risk in terms of operational leverage by having a significantly
higher ratio of tangible assets to total assets. One possible explanation is that
being protected allows management to take additional risk that it would not
otherwise take.
Table IV displays the results of the estimations when the ratio of investing
activities to total assets serves as the dependent variable. PROTEC is positive
meaning that protected firms on average have received more cash from selling
activities than they have spent on investments, although the coefficient is not
significantly different from zero in either of the equations. This means that we
may reject the second hypothesis.
The first control variable LSDEBT has the expected positive sign since firms tend
to finance investing activities with long term debt Even though the coefficient of
LSDEBT is positive, it is far from being significantly different from zero.  In
addition, DEBTEQ measures the effect of leverage on investment activities. Table
IV shows that the coefficient is not significantly different from zero either. As a
consequence, the model does only explain a relatively low degree of the variation
in the ratio of investing activities to total assets (although this is not unusual in
cross sectional studies).
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Table IV: Regression estimates of Investing Activities (without securities) to
Total Assets as the dependent variable with heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors (see White (1980)). 102 observations based on five year averages
(1995-99). The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics.
PROTEC: Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is effectively protected
against takeovers according to the article’s definition of an effective takeover
defense, otherwise it equals zero.
LSDEBT:  The ratio of long-term debt to short-term debt.
DEBTEQ:  The ratio of both long-term and short-term debt to book equity.
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                            3.
CONSTANT                              -0.653                      -0,646                     -0,461
                                          (-2.495)                    (-2.470)                   (-3.712)
PROTEC                                   0.191                        0.188                     0.175
                                          (1.654)                      (1.611)                   (1.567)
LSDEBT                                   0.062                        0.064                      0.037
                                               (0.877)                       (0.910)                   (0.671)
DEBTEQ                                  0.006
                                               (0.142)
Adj. R2                                                        0.13                           0.13                      0.06
The third hypothesis relates takeover defenses to capital structure. Table V
displays the results when the ratio of debt to equity is regressed against four
variables that have been found to significantly influence leverage (see  Rajan and
Zingales (1995)).
Notice that the coefficient of PROTEC is  negative and even significantly different
from zero in all the equations. The four control variables are not significantly
different from zero but they have the same sign as found by Rajan and Zingales
(1995) although some variables are significantly different from zero on a 10
percent level. This means that one can not reject the third hypothesis since being
protected or not has an considerable impact on a firms choice of capital
structure.
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Table V: Regression estimates of the ratio of Debt to Equity as the dependent
variable with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (see White (1980)). 102
observations based on five year averages (1995-99). The numbers in the
parentheses are t-statistics.
DEBTEQ:  The ratio of both long-term and short-term debt to book equity.
PROTEC: Dummy variable that equals one if the company is effectively protected
against a takeover according to the earlier stated definition of an effective
takeover defense, otherwise it is equal to zero.
TANGIBLE: Tangible assets to total assets (securities have been excluded).
ROA: Net income plus interests before tax divided by total book assets.
LNBEME: Natural log of book equity divided by natural log of market equity at the
end of the fiscal year.
LNSALES: Natural log of sales.
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                          3.
CONSTANT                              0.743                       0.854                       1.473
                                          (1.735)                     (2.404)                     (7.354)
PROTEC                                  -0.659                       -0.590                    -0.433
                                         (-2.074)                     (-2.694)                   (-2.544)
TANGIBLE                               0.176
                                               (0.309)
ROA                                        -0.028                       -0.028
                                              (-1.918)                     (-1.855)
LNBEME                                 -0.392                       -0.382
                                              (-1.725)                     (-1.737)
LNSALES                                0.095                        0.097
                                              (1.860)                      (1.836)
 Adj. R2                                                        0.25                         0.21                      0.08
One possible explanation is that managers seek to avoid takeovers by increasing
leverage. This is especially relevant for LBO’s since a higher degree of financial
leverage lowers the probability of a forthcoming LBO. The acquirer may not be
able to increase leverage substantially due to the increased risk for financial
distress. This is simply because there may not be enough assets to serve as
collateral.
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Alternatively, managers may prefer to increase leverage instead of introducing
takeover defenses since the market may react negatively towards the latter (i.e.
substitution effect).
Turning to the last two hypotheses related to Jensen’s free cash flow, table VI
displays the results when the dependent variable equals the free cash flow to total
assets. A firm’s cash flow is closely related to the size of the firm, c.f. the firm’s
position on the Product Life Cycles (PLC) curve. To capture the changes in a
firm’s cash flow level with size, a new explanatory variable denoted LNSALES (the
natural log of sales) has been added in all the equations.
Table VI: Regression estimates of Free Cash Flow to Total Assets as the
dependent variable with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors see (White
(1980)). 102 observations based on five year averages (1995-99). The numbers in
the parentheses are t-statistics.
PROTEC: Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is effectively protected
against takeovers according to the article’s definition of an effective takeover
defense, otherwise it equals zero.
LNSALES:  The natural log of sales
DEBTEQ:  The ratio of both long-term and short-term debt to book equity.
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                            3.
CONSTANT                              0.015                        0.054                      0.047
                                          (0.131)                      (2.500)                    (2.399)
PROTEC                                   0.011                        0.005                      0.003
                                          (0.569)                      (0.220)                    (0.116)
DEBTEQ                                  0.008                         0.006
                                               (0.851)                       (0.676)
LNSALES                                 -0.011
                                               (-0.624)
Adj. R2                                                        0.10                           0.07                      0.03
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Notice that PROTEC is positive although the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero in any of the equations. The findings do not support the fifth
hypothesis since agency costs seem to be low in relation to the free cash flow,
meaning that management in protected Danish firms does not opportunistically
seek to create a high level of free cash flow (alternatively the model could be mis-
specified). Jensen argues that a high degree of debt may reduce management’s
tendency towards creating free cash flows. But this is not confirmed by the
results in table VI since the variable DEBTEQ (which measures the impact of debt
on the free cash flow) is not significantly different from zero. This  indicates that
debt does not reduce agency costs associated with the free cash flow.
Table VII: Regression estimates of Investment in securities to Total Assets as
the dependent variable with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (see
White (1980)). 102 observations based on five year averages (1995-99). The
number in the parentheses are t-statistics.
PROTEC: Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is effectively protected
against takeovers according to the article’s definition of an effective takeover
defense, otherwise it equals zero.
LNSALES:  The natural log of sales.
DEBTEQ:  The ratio of both long-term and short-term debt to book equity.
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                            3.
CONSTANT                              -0.004                       -0.072                     -0.024
                                          (-0.018)                     (-1.021)                   (-0.511)
PROTEC                                   -0.055                       -0.051                     -0.036
                                          (-1.540)                     (-0.952)                   (-0.758)
DEBTEQ                                  0.037                        0.035
                                               (1.523)                      (1.449)
LNSALES                                 -0.008
                                               (-0.226)
 Adj. R2                                                       0.11                           0.10                      0.04
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Table VII shows the result of the estimations when the dependent variable equals
cash out flows in Securities to total assets. The coefficient of PROTEC is negative,
indicating that protected firms have a higher ratio of investment in securities to
assets than unprotected firms, although not significantly.
Table VII further shows that a higher ratio of debt to equity does not have a
significant impact on the dependent variable and this is also the case for the
second control variable LNSALES.
Adding dummies for industry effects only has a small effect on the obtained
results since they have no significant impact on any of the financial ratios.
Several studies investigate the influence of e.g. ownership structures upon a
firm’s financial structure and performance (see  Short (1994) for a critical review).
To control for the effects caused by large shareholders, all regressions equations
have been re-estimated adding two new explanatory variables. The first variable is
equal to the sum in percentage of the voting rights held by all shareholders who
have more than 5 percent of the votes. To capture the interaction effect between
the dummy variable PROTEC and ownership by large shareholders, a second
variable has been added that equals the ownership variable multiplied by
PROTEC. The ownership variable is in neither of the equations significantly
different from zero and this is also the case with the second variable that models
the interaction effect. But more importantly, adding two variables to control for
ownership effects does not change the significance of the variable PROTEC in any
of the equations, including when the dependent variable equals debt to equity.
The interpretation is that ownership structures do not significantly influence
whether management is oriented towards long or short-term investments, are less
leveraged or have any significant excess of cash. (See Voetmann and Neumann
(1999) who find that ownership concentration does not influence share price
movements on the Danish stock market).
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7.  Simultaneous estimation analysis
All the previous results rest upon the assumption that the causation runs from
whether a firm is effectively protected to the considered financial ratios or not.
However, this approach could be biased since one may well argue that the
causation could run in the opposite direction i.e. a firms ratio of debt to equity
may influence whether management seeks to protect the firm or not. This section
therefore analyzes if the level of tangible assets as well as leverage has any
significant impact on whether a firm is effectively protected or not.
The problem of causation in empirical studies of corporate governance has within
the last years received more attention. For instance, simultaneous structural
equation models have been increasingly applied because of the ability to model
the causality between ownership and performance (this question should not be
confused with exogeneity and the familiar concept of Granger causality in time-
series analysis). To address the problem of causality researchers normally use
simultaneous equation estimation hereby constructing more than one equation.
The system of equations may be estimated e.g. using instrumental variables and
two stage least squares conditioned on the equations being identified. However,
this approach only works well if there are no dummy variables serving as
dependent variables. If this is the case, as in this article,
Heckmann (1978) shows that the results are biased since the residuals of the
equations are correlated with some of the independent variables. Heckmann
constructs a model which allows consistent estimation and formulates some
alternative estimators. Following Heckmann, the model concerning PROTEC’s
influence on the level of tangible assets may be formulated as a system consisting
of two equations.
     TANGIBLEi = a11i + α12LSDEBTi + α13CAPEXPi + β1Di + γ1PROTEC*i + ε1i         (1)   
      PROTEC*i  = a21i + α22DUALCLi + α23FOUNDi  +  β2Di + γ2TANGIBLEi + ε2i             (2)
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The two endogenous variables, TANGIBLEi and PROTECi are supplemented by a
set of predetermined variables which in this case consist solely of exogenous
variables where the crucial characteristic of the predetermined variables are that
they are independent of current and future disturbances. DUALCLi is a dummy
that equals one if firms have shares with dual class voting rights, otherwise it
equals zero. FOUNDi is a dummy variable that equals one if a foundation or trust
dominates the firm, otherwise it equals zero.
TANGIBLEi equals the ratio of tangible assets to total assets for firm i. PROTEC*i is
a latent non-dummy variable that measures the protectiveness of the
management against a contested takeover. Di is defined as a dummy variable that
equals one if protectiveness exceeds a certain threshold, otherwise zero,
according to the categorization in section 4.
LSDEBTi  is identical to the ratio of long to short term debt for firm i. CAPEXPi
equals net capital expenditures to sales for firm i.  We notice that the system is
identified through exclusions since it obeys the order condition (see Johnston and
Dinardo p. 312 (1997)).
The errors εi are assumed to satisfy the standard assumptions. Finally, to secure
that equations (1) and (2) define a statistic model the principal assumption of
Heckmann that γ2β1 + β2 = 0 must be made.
Table VIII shows the results of the estimations of the first equation (1) in the
system which is the equation of primary interests. In order to estimate the first
equation, it must be transformed into expression (1A) in the appendix.
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Table VIII: Regression estimates following Heckmann’s (1978) procedure with
Tangible assets to total assets as the dependent variable. 102 observations
based on five year averages (1995-99). The numbers in the parentheses are t-
statistics.
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                       3.
 CONSTANT                               -0,318                      -0,318                 -0,335
                                           (-1,117)                     (-1,146)               (-1,123)
 LSDEBT                                   -0,003
                                           (-0,028)
 CAPEXP                                    0,093                       0.096
                                                 (0,016)                     (0,172)
 D                                               0,087                      0,086                   0,094
                                                 (0,467)                     (0,478)                (0,400)
 PROTEC*                                  0,071                       0,077                  0,080
                                                 (0,188)                     (0,192)                (0,184)
 Adj. R2                                                         0.08                          0.08                    0.06
Contrary to the previous results c.f. table III, the calculations based on the  model
developed by Heckman (1978) show that a firm’s protectiveness does not
significantly influence the level of tangible assets since both variables D and
PROTEC* are not significantly different from zero. Both CAPEXP as well as
LSDEBT are not significant either. Seeking to incorporate the causation between
the variables explicitly therefore alters the results considerably, meaning that we
may reject the first hypothesis.
When the dependent variable is DEBTEQ the system may be formulated as:     
          DETBEQi = a11i + α12ROAi + α13SALESi + β1Di + γ1PROTEC*i + ε1i         (3)   
    PROTEC*i  = a21i + α22DUALCLi + α23FOUNDi  +  β2Di + γ2DEBTEQi + ε2i             (4)
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ROAi equals return on assets for firm i and SALESi is identical to the natural log
of sales for firm i. The system is estimated in exactly the same way as the
previous one (see also the appendix table X). Table IX displays the results when
the dependent variable is identical to the ratio debt to equity. In this case both
variables D and PROTEC* remain significantly different from zero, supporting the
findings that whether or not a firm is protected has an impact on its level of debt
to equity. Both control variables are not significantly different from zero.
One explanation is that managers in unprotected firms may seek to avoid a
possible takeover by increasing debt relative to equity, although other factors may
also influence why protected firms have less debt. The results therefore support
the findings of Safieddine and Titman (1999) who find that firms protected by
antitakeover laws substantially reduce their debt and that unprotected firms do
the reverse.
Table VIII: Regression estimates following Heckmann’s (1978) procedure with
Debt to equity as the dependent variable. 102 observations based on five year
averages (1995-99). The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics.
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                       3.
 CONSTANT                               -0,036                      -0,057                 -0,068
                                           (-0,043)                     (-0,069)               (-0,898)
 ROA                                          -0,015
                                           (-0,953)
 LNSALES                                  0,145                        0.125
                                                 (1,531)                      (1,352)
 D                                               -0,179                      -0,152                  -0,010
                                                 (-1,981)                    (-1,990)                (-1,904)
 PROTEC*                                  -0,889                      -0,875                  -0,838
                                                 (-2,027)                    (-2,211)                (-2,106)
 Adj. R2                                                          0.16                          0.16                    0.14
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The results may also be given another interpretation, namely that, debt could
serve as a kind of bonding mechanism (see Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Management in unprotected firms could signal that it does not try to entrench
itself by taking more debt than management would do compared to the firms
optimal mix between debt and equity.
To summarize, the article shows that unprotected firms have significantly more
debt than protected firms, meaning that none of the other hypotheses could be
confirmed. However, one may argue that other factors constrain the market for
corporate control in Denmark, such that being unprotected does not necessarily
mean that a Danish firm is directly exposed to the threat of a takeover bids.
8. Conclusion
The article analyses the relation between takeover defenses and managerial
incentives to invest using a sample consisting of listed Danish firms. Several
hypotheses are tested in relation to how effective takeover defenses influence
whether management is oriented toward long or short term financial investments,
holds any “excess” cash flow or prefers to use debt instead of equity. All issues,
that cast light on the desirability of the proposal set forth by the EU, including
the US/UK inspired principle of one share – one vote.
Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms consist mainly of shares with dual
class voting rights in combination with trust ownership although voting and
ownership limitations also are quite common.
The article finds that firms effectively protected against takeovers have a
significantly higher degree of financial leverage (debt to equity  ratio). It is argued
that debt may serve as a substitute for takeover defenses. Specifically,
management may refrain from introducing takeover defenses due to a negative
reaction from the stock market.
In addition, the article does not find that protected firms are more oriented
towards  long term investment projects or have more excess cash flow to their
disposal compared to unprotected firms. This indicates that agency costs
associated with takeover defenses in Danish firms are not severe.
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In order to deal with the problem of the causation between the variables an
approach formulated by Heckmann (1978) is used which involves simultaneous
equation estimation.
However, one should acknowledge that the theory of a market for corporate
control, including its effect on managerial incentives,  builds on institutional
conditions that may not be fully satisfied in Denmark. Whether takeover defenses
in general and in particular a market for corporate control are  beneficial for
European is still an open but very relevant question.
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Appendix
Correlation matrix
Descriptive Statistics
PROTEC TRUSTS DUALCL DEBTEQ CAPEXP SALES BEME ROA INVEST TANGI FCF SECUR TURN LSDEBT
PROTEC 1,00
TRUSTS 0,21 1,00
DUALCL 0,29 0,31 1,00
DEBTEQ -0,21 -0,02 -0,21 1,00
CAPEXP -0,05 -0,05 0,12 0,03 1,00
SALES 0,14 -0,02 -0,01 0,09 -0,24 1,00
BEME -0,14 0,05 0,07 -0,22 0,20 -0,15 1,00
ROA -0,03 -0,04 -0,21 -0,06 -0,08 0,20 -0,31 1,00
INVEST 0,05 0,06 -0,03 0,09 0,47 -0,02 0,06 -0,07 1,00
TANGI 0,11 0,01 -0,12 0,01 0,04 0,06 0,08 0,03 -0,03 1,00
FCF 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,10 0,65 -0,08 0,20 -0,02 0,39 0,38 1,00
SECUR 0,05 0,06 -0,03 0,09 0,47 -0,02 0,06 -0,07 1,00 -0,03 0,39 1,00
TURN -0,17 0,08 -0,06 0,18 -0,21 0,14 -0,25 0,07 -0,15 0,12 0,04 -0,15 1,00
LSDEBT -0,07 -0,08 -0,18 -0,02 -0,10 0,12 0,09 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,15 0,01 -0,14 1,00
PROTEC TRUSTS DUALCL DEBTEQ CAPEXP SALES BEME
Average 0,29 0,28 0,51 1,16 0,01 6,98 -0,34
Median 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,01 -0,01 6,95 -0,20
Std.deviation 0,46 0,45 0,50 1,25 0,14 1,49 0,86
Sample variance 0,21 0,21 0,25 1,57 0,02 2,22 0,74
Kurtosis -1,18 -1,08 -2,04 27,76 99,56 -0,35 0,13
Scewness 0,92 0,97 -0,04 2,64 9,92 0,05 -0,54
Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00 -4,49 -0,08 3,51 -2,49
Maximum 1,00 1,00 1,00 10,00 1,45 10,43 1,54
ROA INVEST TANGI FCF SECUR TURNOVER LSDEBT
Average 8,88 -0,01 -0,39 -0,02 -0,01 1,27 0,60
Median 8,10 0,00 -0,23 -0,02 0,00 1,20 0,39
Std.deviation 8,15 0,33 0,73 0,15 0,33 0,55 0,97
Sample variance 66,47 0,11 0,53 0,02 0,11 0,30 0,94
Kurtosis 3,82 58,26 35,89 18,03 58,26 1,53 28,83
Scewness 0,98 -5,13 -5,21 2,51 -5,13 0,80 4,93
Minimum -17,00 -2,84 -5,95 -0,49 -2,84 0,02 0,00
Maximum 41,40 1,58 1,20 0,95 1,58 3,21 7,26
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Calculations of estimations
In order to estimate equation (1) and (2) as well as (3) and (4) we start by
generating instruments from a probit model with D as the dependent variable
with all four predetermined variables as independent variables. Let y1i  denote
TANGIBLE, respectively DEBTEQ and y*2i PROTEC*. Next step is to calculate the
following expression;
222211½
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ii
i XX
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+=                                                      (1A)
iX 1 is a 102 × 2 matrix consisting of observations from the variables LSDEBT and
CAPSALES for each firm, respectively ROA and SALES for each firm. iX 2 is a 102
× 2 matrix consisting of observations of the variables DUALCL and FOUND. The
vectors i1πˆ  and i2πˆ  are equal to the estimates obtained from the probit model of
the four variables yielding (-0,0778, -1,5913) and (0.7064, 0.3617). The results of
the probit estimates when DEBTEQ is the dependent variable are (0.0006,
0.1454) and (0.7305, 0.3852) respectively.
The denominator in expression (1A), ½22ω  comes from the reduced form variance
and serves to normalize the estimate. To get the fitted values of the probit model,
the values in expression (1A) are transformed by the standard normal cumulative
density function. Equations (1) and (3) are then estimated by the following
expression:
( ) )ˆ()ˆ(ˆˆ ½22*2½22*2*111*1½22*21111 −−− −+−++++= ωωγβεγωβα iiiiiiiii yyPDyPXy ,        (2A)
where iPˆ  are the fitted values from the probit. Expression (2A) yields unique
consistent estimates of the parameters and where the last three terms are
residuals. To get the estimates of equations (2) and (4) we use expression (1b’) in
Heckmann (1978) page 944 which is equal to:
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The left hand of equation (3A) is denoted δ and the coefficients below are obtained
by dividing the regression coefficients by - *2γˆ . The matrix X2i contains a constant
and the variables DUALCL and FOUND. The results are shown in table X.
Table X. Estimations of equation 3A
                            δTANGI          δDEBTEQ
  Constant            1,254               3,817
                           (2,427)              (0,922)
  DUALCL             2,478               1,860
                           (0,857)              (0.722)
  FOUND              5,810                3,007
                           (1,203)              (0,998)
  γ*2                     -1,084               -0.150
                           (0.201)              (0.524)
  Adj. R2                0.05                  0.09
The main purpose in this article is the first equation in both systems whereas the
second equations serve more as auxiliary equations to estimate the first one.
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